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Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

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  • John R. Wright

    (Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall,154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210–1373)

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.

Suggested Citation

  • John R. Wright, 2010. "Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(2), pages 217-245, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:2:p:217-245
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629809359035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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