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Bargaining for Costs of Convergence in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism II

Author

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  • Christian H. Fahrholz

    (Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, christian.fahrholz@uni-konstanz.de)

Abstract

The Exchange-Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) is a Maastricht convergence criterion with which Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) must comply before they are admitted to the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, EMU accession is not a ‘free lunch’ as it entails so-called costs of convergence. Starting from the point of view that these new members of the European Union (EU) are in fact credibly committed to joining the EMU for political reasons - that is, ensuring political stability in CEECs - it is demonstrated that CEECs are able to pass some costs of convergence on to current EMU members: CEECs will under identifiable conditions threaten to halt the entire enlargement process by putting their exchange-rate regimes and, as a result, political stability at risk. In line with this rationale, the entire process of transition within ERM II, can be modelled as a two-stage threat game, which may be solved by a Rubinstein bargaining solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian H. Fahrholz, 2007. "Bargaining for Costs of Convergence in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism II," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 193-214, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:193-214
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807074276
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    References listed on IDEAS

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