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Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Alemán

    (Department of Political Science, University of Houston, ealeman2@uh.edu)

  • Thomas Schwartz

    (Department of Political Science, UCLA, tschwartz@polisci.ucla.edu)

Abstract

A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Alemán & Thomas Schwartz, 2006. "Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(1), pages 98-120, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:1:p:98-120
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629806059598
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cheibub, José Antonio & Przeworski, Adam & Saiegh, Sebastian M., 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 565-587, October.
    2. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900.
    3. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivera, Mauricio & Pachón, Mónica & Perry, Guillermo, 2010. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform: The Case of Colombia, 1986-2006," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1718, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Thomas Schwartz, 2008. "Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 353-377, September.

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