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Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de políticas en Paraguay, 1954-2003

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  • Sebastian Saiegh
  • Marcela Montero
  • Anibal Pérez-Liñán
  • José Molinas

Abstract

(Documento disponible en idioma inglés) En este trabajo se describe la evolución del proceso de diseño de políticas de Paraguay (PMP, por sus siglas en inglés) entre 1954 y 2003. Se presenta una panorámica general del PMP durante el gobierno de Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) y se analiza el entorno institucional después de 1989. Se trata la manera en que el Partido Colorado se fue dividiendo progresivamente en varias facciones y se describen los patrones que caracterizan el proceso de diseño de políticas que surgieron tras la adopción de la Constitución de 1992. Se plantea la hipótesis de que la presencia de una gran cantidad de factores con poder de veto ha dificultado el proceso de cambio de políticas y que los legisladores parecen inclinarse por políticas particularistas. A fin de comprobar esas hipótesis empleamos una base de datos que contiene prácticamente todos los proyectos de ley presentados al Congreso desde abril de 1992. Las conclusiones sugieren que el PMP actual de Paraguay puede ser flexible en cuanto a la prestación de beneficios particularistas pero rígido en cuanto a la aprobación de políticas amplias de regulación o redistribución.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Saiegh & Marcela Montero & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & José Molinas, 2006. "Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de políticas en Paraguay, 1954-2003," Research Department Publications 3195, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3195
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