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A political–institutional explanation of environmental performance in Latin America

Author

Listed:
  • Denis Rey

    (University of Tampa, USA)

  • Joshua Ozymy

    (Texas A&M University Corpus Christi, USA)

Abstract

This research utilizes the 2010 Environmental Performance Index to examine how electoral rules affect environmental performance in 20 Latin American democracies. Using supporting time-series analysis with dependent variables for habitat protection, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide emissions from 2000 to 2008, our study finds that proportionality and party systems influence environmental performance in the region. Results show that representation impacts ecosystem vitality more so than public health. We account for this gap by arguing that levels of political representation influence the allocation of public and private goods which, in turn, help determine environmental outcomes. Our findings do not always paint a consistent picture, which may be attributed to the difficulties of operationalizing complex concepts such as environmental performance within and across countries and examining how these relationships change over time. Additional research is warranted to tease out these relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis Rey & Joshua Ozymy, 2019. "A political–institutional explanation of environmental performance in Latin America," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 295-311, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:22:y:2019:i:4:p:295-311
    DOI: 10.1177/2233865919833979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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