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Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Samuel Merrill III

    (Wilkes University, smerrill@wilkes.edu)

  • James Adams

    (University of California, Santa Barbara, adams@polsci.ucsb.edu)

Abstract

This paper analyzes factors that affect candidates’ position-taking incentives in multi-candidate and multi-party elections. Following Cox (1990), we define centrifugal incentives as those that motivate vote-seeking candidates to take more extreme positions relative to the center of the voter distribution. For a multivariate vote model that includes a Left-Right policy component, a party identification component and an unmeasured term that renders the vote choice probabilistic, we present theoretical and computer simulation results that quantify candidates’ incentives to shift their policies away from the center in the direction of their partisan constituencies’ mean policy preferences. Centrifugal incentives are found to increase with (1) the salience of policies and party identification, (2) the size of the candidate field, (3) the size of a candidate’s partisan constituency and (4) more extreme constituency policy preferences. Thus, ceteris paribus, candidates who represent large constituencies are motivated to present more extreme policies than are candidates who represent small ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Merrill III & James Adams, 2002. "Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 275-300, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:275-300
    DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jon H. Fiva & Olle Folke & Rune J. Sørensen, 2013. "The Power of Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 4119, CESifo.
    2. Dimitrios Xefteris & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2017. "Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 357-381, May.

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