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Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote

Author

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  • Erikson, Robert S.
  • Romero, David W.

Abstract

Most applications of spatial modeling to the problem of electoral competition are pessimistic regarding the prospects for candidate equilibrium in more than one policy dimension. Probabilistic models of the vote, however, increase the likelihood of equilibrium. We expand the probabilistic model to include measured nonissue variables, thereby representing the general multivariate model of behavioral research. For this model we offer a general candidate equilibrium solution and illustrate with some simulations based on 1988 National Election Study data. The more complicated one's model of voters' motivations, the greater appears to be the chance of locating a candidate equilibrium position in policy space.

Suggested Citation

  • Erikson, Robert S. & Romero, David W., 1990. "Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1103-1126, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:04:p:1103-1126_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabian Gouret & Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2011. "An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 309-340, July.
    2. Norman Schofield, 2013. "The “probability of a fit choice”," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(2), pages 129-150, June.
    3. Lawrence Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, 2005. "Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 439-462, June.
    4. Michael Bruter & Robert Erikson & Aaron Strauss, 2010. "Uncertain candidates, valence, and the dynamics of candidate position-taking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 153-168, July.
    5. Samuel Merrill III & James Adams, 2002. "Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 275-300, July.
    6. Bagh, Adib, 2014. "Candidates' Uncertainty and Error Distribution Models in Electoral Competitions," MPRA Paper 77631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Norman Schofield & Christopher Claassen & Ugur Ozdemir & Alexei Zakharov, 2011. "Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 483-518, April.
    8. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "Political competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 249-271.
    9. Podkolzina, Elena & Kuletskaya, Lada & Demidova, Olga, 2022. "Spatial modelling of voting preferences: The “Mystery” of the Republic of Tatarstan," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 67, pages 74-96.
    10. Michael Peress, 2011. "Securing the base: electoral competition under variable turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 87-104, July.
    11. John Jackson, 2014. "Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 197-218, April.
    12. Anna-Sophie Kurella & Franz Urban Pappi, 2015. "Combining ideological and policy distances with valence for a model of party competition in Germany 2009," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 86-107, January.
    13. Michael Peress, 2010. "The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 265-294, February.
    14. Richard F. Potthoff, 2022. "Radial Symmetry Does Not Preclude Condorcet Cycles If Different Voters Weight the Issues Differently," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-17, July.
    15. Henning, Christian H. C. A. & Petri, Svetlana & Diaz, Daniel, 2020. "Changes in voter behavior after an information signal: An experimental approach for Senegal," Working Papers of Agricultural Policy WP2020-11, University of Kiel, Department of Agricultural Economics, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
    16. Tom Blockmans & Marie-Anne Guerry, 2015. "Probabilistic Spatial Power Indexes: The Impact of Issue Saliences and Distance Selection," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 675-697, July.

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