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The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying Networks

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  • Daniel P. Carpenter
  • Kevin M. Esterling
  • David M. J. Lazer

Abstract

How does policy information flow through Washington `issue networks'? And how does information flow determine which lobbyists get access in policy-making? Drawing upon the `strength of weak ties' argument, the authors argue that policy information passes more through acquaintances (`weak ties') than through close, trusted, contacts (`strong ties'). They support this argument in an analysis of data on lobbying networks in health-care policy-making in the 1970s and 1980s. The statistical analyses show that access to policy-makers in Washington is network-autocorrelated : a lobbyist's access depends upon the access of other lobbyists s/he knows. The results demonstrate the importance of weak ties as a restricted form of `social capital' in policy-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel P. Carpenter & Kevin M. Esterling & David M. J. Lazer, 1998. "The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying Networks," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(4), pages 417-444, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:4:p:417-444
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010004003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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