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The Impact of Automation on Elections

Author

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  • Vicente Reyes

    (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)

Abstract

The unprecedented synchronized automated elections of May 2010 in the Philippines saw how results of presidential elections could be obtained nearly overnight. Such nation-wide occurrences dramatically altered the mode in which Philippine elections had always been propagated: Typified by arduous and oftentimes onerous delays in the publication of results stretching all the way to several months after the day of the elections. This inquiry explores the implications of this change to prevailing theories and practices of election reforms. More importantly, it critiques the premise that the automation of elections curbs corruption and that it generates authentic political competition. Using data obtained from last May 2010 synchronized automated elections, this inquiry proposes several analytical models in understanding the interplay of election reforms and corruption in determining electoral outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Vicente Reyes, 2013. "The Impact of Automation on Elections," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 29(3), pages 259-285, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jodeso:v:29:y:2013:i:3:p:259-285
    DOI: 10.1177/0169796X13494276
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    References listed on IDEAS

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