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Challenging the wisdom on preferential proportional representation

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  • Carol Mershon

Abstract

The conclusion to the special issue takes stock of both the first and the second generations of research on preferential proportional representation (PR) and electoral personalism. The article uses this appraisal in order to locate this project’s achievements within extant scholarship. It argues that the project not only reevaluates but also challenges the wisdom on preferential PR. In challenging the canon, the project enriches the study of electoral institutions, political parties, legislative politics, comparative politics, and political science more broadly.

Suggested Citation

  • Carol Mershon, 2020. "Challenging the wisdom on preferential proportional representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 168-182, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:1:p:168-182
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892334
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    Cited by:

    1. José Antonio Cheibub & Gisela Sin, 2020. "Preference vote and intra-party competition in open list PR systems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 70-95, January.
    2. José Antonio Cheibub & Monika Nalepa, 2020. "Revisiting electoral personalism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 3-10, January.

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