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Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993

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  • Benjamin Nyblade
  • Steven R. Reed

Abstract

When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.

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  • Benjamin Nyblade & Steven R. Reed, 2008. "Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 926-941, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:52:y:2008:i:4:p:926-941
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00351.x
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bertrand Blancheton & Dina Chhorn, 2021. "Government Intervention, Institutional Quality, and Income Inequality: Evidence from Asia and the Pacific, 1988–2014," Post-Print hal-03770836, HAL.
    3. Chatterjee, Somdeep & Mookerjee, Mehreen & Ojha, Manini & Roy, Sanket, 2023. "Does increased credibility of elections lead to higher political competition? Evidence from India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    4. Joshua D. Potter & Margit Tavits, 2011. "Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Vincenzo Alfano & Salvatore Capasso & Lodovico Santoro, 2023. "Corruption and the political system: some evidence from Italian regions," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 665-695, July.
    6. Vuković, Vuk, 2020. "Corruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 124-143.
    7. Wong, Mathew Y.H., 2021. "Democracy, hybrid regimes, and inequality: The divergent effects of contestation and inclusiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).

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