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Led Astray

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  • Alyssa K. Prorok

Abstract

This article examines the impact that rebel and state leaders have on civil war duration. It argues that leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment at the hands of internal audiences and opponents influence their strategic decision-making during war. Specifically, leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment should they perform poorly, particularly for rebel and high-risk state leaders. As a result, these leaders have incentives to gamble for resurrection, extending ongoing wars in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding punishment. This suggests that civil wars are less likely to end when responsible leaders hold power, especially if the responsible leader is highly vulnerable to punishment. These propositions are tested using original data on all rebel and state leaders involved in civil conflicts between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationship between leader responsibility and war duration.

Suggested Citation

  • Alyssa K. Prorok, 2018. "Led Astray," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(6), pages 1179-1204, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:62:y:2018:i:6:p:1179-1204
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002716680265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Prorok, Alyssa K., 2017. "The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 213-243, April.
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