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Majority rule and allocation

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  • Benjamin Ward

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Ward, 1961. "Majority rule and allocation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 5(4), pages 379-389, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:5:y:1961:i:4:p:379-389
    DOI: 10.1177/002200276100500405
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    Cited by:

    1. Green-Armytage, James, 2011. "Strategic voting and nomination," MPRA Paper 32200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics.
    3. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2016. "Matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts," Papers 1607.02378, arXiv.org.
    4. Wittman, Donald, 2005. "Voting on Income Redistribution: How a Little Bit of Altruism Creates Transitivity," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6x11511s, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    5. Terry Sullivan, 1976. "Voter's paradox and logrolling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 31-44, March.
    6. David Chapman, 1968. "Models of the working of a two-party electoral system Part II," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 19-37, September.
    7. Subochev, Andrey, 2008. "Dominant, weakly stable, uncovered sets: properties and extensions," MPRA Paper 53421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. John Carter, 2007. "An Empirical Note on Economic Freedom and Income Inequality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 163-177, January.
    9. Subochev, Andrey & Aleskerov, Fuad & Pislyakov, Vladimir, 2018. "Ranking journals using social choice theory methods: A novel approach in bibliometrics," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 416-429.

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