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Divergent Beliefs in “Bargaining and the Nature of Warâ€

Author

Listed:
  • Alastair Smith

    (Department of Political Science, New York University)

  • Allan C. Stam

    (Government Department, Dartmouth College)

Abstract

Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay (2006) take issue with the presentation of how players' beliefs diverge in “Bargaining and the Nature of War†(Smith and Stam 2004). In that article, the authors constructed a model of bargaining between two nations in which the nations have noncommon priors about the probability with which either nation would eventually prevail, should a war between them continue to a decisive conclusion. The players' divergent beliefs make up one of the fundamental potential causes of war in the model. Fey and Ramsay argue that Smith and Stam's departure from the standard common priors assumption is an unnecessary deviation from convention. The authors disagree, arguing that their different approach to modeling disagreement between rational actors provides a useful way to approach the empirical puzzle they set out to explore, namely, how rational actors with divergent beliefs might settle their disagreements in the context of war.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2006. "Divergent Beliefs in “Bargaining and the Nature of Warâ€," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(4), pages 614-618, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:4:p:614-618
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1998. "Common Priors: A Reply to Gul," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 929-938, July.
    2. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    3. Morris, Stephen, 1995. "The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 227-253, October.
    4. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
    5. Faruk Gul, 1998. "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 923-928, July.
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