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Relative Gains Concerns when the Number of States in the International System Increases

Author

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  • James S. Mosher

    (Department of Political Science Ohio University, Athens)

Abstract

Realists argue that relative gains concerns make cooperation more difficult than liberal institutionalists expect. In response, Duncan Snidal has argued that when the number of states increases, the problem of relative gains concerns is generally attenuated. The author contends that current analysis of the impact of increasing the number of states is contingent on two implicit and inaccurate assumptions. Relative gains concerns, rather than being relative “absolute†gains concerns, are relative “percentage†gains concerns, and currently, an increase in the number of states is caused by the breakup of a state. Using these new assumptions, the author shows that when the number of states increases, the negative impact of relative gains concerns can continue under many conditions to inhibit cooperation. The results have specific predictions about changes in the likelihood of cooperation due to state breakup, such as the Soviet Union, and state merging, such as the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • James S. Mosher, 2003. "Relative Gains Concerns when the Number of States in the International System Increases," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(5), pages 642-668, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:5:p:642-668
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002703254296
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthew Mulford & Jeffery Berejikian, 2002. "Behavioural Decision Theory and the Gains Debate in International Politics," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(2), pages 209-229, June.
    2. Gowa, Joanne & Mansfield, Edward D., 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 408-420, June.
    3. Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 485-507, July.
    4. Grieco, Joseph & Powell, Robert & Snidal, Duncan, 1993. "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 729-743, September.
    5. Powell, Robert, 1993. "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 115-132, March.
    6. Snidal, Duncan, 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 701-726, September.
    7. Powell, Robert, 1991. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1303-1320, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michal Parízek, 2017. "Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 559-583, December.

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