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Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict

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  • Dan Reiter

    (Department of Political Science, Emory University)

Abstract

Military strategy is an area of growing interest in the study of international conflict. It is linked to the outbreak, duration, and outcome of wars. This article presents the first quantitative empirical tests of the proposition that military strategy affects the outbreak of international conflict. The focus is on maneuver-oriented military strategies, such as the German blitzkrieg in World War II, which are hypothesized to be particularly conflict prone. Tests were conducted on the initiation and escalation of militarized interstate disputes for a sample of states from 1903 to 1992. The results indicate that states with maneuver strategies were significantly more likely to initiate disputes in general, although not disputes that escalate to the use of force. However, dispute participants with maneuver strategies were significantly more likely to escalate a dispute to war if the adversary employed a military strategy that emphasized attrition.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Reiter, 1999. "Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(3), pages 366-387, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:3:p:366-387
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reiter, Dan & Stam, Allan C., 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 377-389, June.
    2. Rousseau, David L. & Gelpi, Christopher & Reiter, Dan & Huth, Paul K., 1996. "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 512-533, September.
    3. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    4. James D. Fearon, 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 236-269, June.
    5. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Morrow, James D. & Zorick, Ethan R., 1997. "Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 15-27, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Modeling Deterrence by Denial and by Punishment," MPRA Paper 95100, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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