IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v31y2014i2p168-192.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa J. Carlson

    (University of Idaho, USA)

  • Raymond Dacey

    (University of Idaho, USA)

Abstract

This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-sided incomplete information version of the Traditional Deterrence Game. The analysis shows when the use of the emotions of fear and anger is effective, ineffective, and counterproductive in altering the decision to initiate or not initiate a crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey, 2014. "The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 168-192, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:31:y:2014:i:2:p:168-192
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894213501975
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894213501975
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0738894213501975?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlson Lisa J & Dacey Raymond, 2010. "A Note on Second Order Probabilities in the Traditional Deterrence Game," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 153-162, January.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    3. Brams, Steven J., 2012. "Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262518252, April.
    4. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    5. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1982. "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 805-824, December.
    6. Allison, Graham T., 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 689-718, November.
    7. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. James D. Fearon, 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 236-269, June.
    9. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    10. Allison, Graham T., 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 689-718, November.
    11. Arthur Lupia & Jesse O. Menning, 2009. "When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 90-106, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Enrico G. De Giorgi & Thierry Post, 2011. "Loss Aversion with a State-Dependent Reference Point," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1094-1110, June.
    2. Soora Rasouli & Harry Timmermans, 2017. "Specification of regret-based models of choice behaviour: formal analyses and experimental design based evidence," Transportation, Springer, vol. 44(6), pages 1555-1576, November.
    3. Joseph Teal & Petko Kusev & Renata Heilman & Rose Martin & Alessia Passanisi & Ugo Pace, 2021. "Problem Gambling ‘Fuelled on the Fly’," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(16), pages 1-14, August.
    4. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Salience and Consumer Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 803-843.
    5. Ivan Moscati, 2022. "Behavioral and heuristic models are as-if models too — and that’s ok," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22177, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Raquel M. Gaspar & Paulo M. Silva, 2023. "Investors’ perspective on portfolio insurance," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 22(1), pages 49-79, January.
    7. Oben K Bayrak & Bengt Kriström, 2016. "Is there a valuation gap? The case of interval valuations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 218-236.
    8. Ulrich Schmidt & Horst Zank, 2012. "A genuine foundation for prospect theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 97-113, October.
    9. Heutel, Garth, 2019. "Prospect theory and energy efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 236-254.
    10. Ronald Bosman & Frans Van Winden, 2010. "Global Risk, Investment and Emotions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(307), pages 451-471, July.
    11. Aluma Dembo & Shachar Kariv & Matthew Polisson & John Quah, 2021. "Ever since Allais," IFS Working Papers W21/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    12. Serge Blondel & Louis Lévy-garboua, 2011. "Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3158-3168.
    13. Ivan Barreda-Tarrazona & Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutierrez & Daniel Navarro-Martinez & Gerardo Sabater-Grande, 2014. "The role of forgone opportunities in decision making under risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 167-188, October.
    14. Topi Miettinen & Olli Ropponen & Pekka Sääskilahti, 2020. "Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1535-1574, October.
    15. Michal Skořepa, 2007. "Zpochybnění deskriptivnosti teorie očekávaného užitku [Doubts about the descriptive validity of the expected utility theory]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(1), pages 106-120.
    16. Zhang, Jing & Wang, Yan & Zhuang, Jun, 2021. "Modeling multi-target defender-attacker games with quantal response attack strategies," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    17. Fershtman, Chaim, 1996. "On the value of incumbency managerial reference points and loss aversion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 245-257, April.
    18. Wang, Di, 2021. "Attention-driven probability weighting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    19. Michael H. Birnbaum & Daniel Navarro-Martinez & Christoph Ungemach & Neil Stewart & Edika G. Quispe-Torreblanca, 2016. "Risky Decision making: Testing for violations of transitivity predicted by an editing mechanism," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(1), pages 75-91, January.
    20. Gijs Kuilen & Peter Wakker, 2006. "Learning in the Allais paradox," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 155-164, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:31:y:2014:i:2:p:168-192. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.