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When Is Universal Contribution Best for the Group?

Author

Listed:
  • Norman Frohlich

    (Faculty of Management, University of Manitoba)

  • Joe Oppenheimer

    (Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland)

Abstract

Social scientists from a variety of disciplines have long been captivated by the simplicity and elegance of the two-person, binary choice prisoners' dilemma (2 × 2 PD). Over the years, the domain of the research has been extended and applied to events that are neither two person nor binary. We use a defining characteristic of the 2 × 2 PD to identify situations under which full levels of contribution are suboptimal. We propose, on the basis of that characteristic, an extended definition and categorization of prisoners' dilemmas to n-person and nonbinary situations. The new distinction is shown to point to differing normative and strategic imperatives for the different categories of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, 1996. "When Is Universal Contribution Best for the Group?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 502-516, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:3:p:502-516
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040003006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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