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The Indirect Link:

Author

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  • Karl R. DeRouen Jr.

    (Texas A&M University, Program in Foreign Policy Decision Making)

Abstract

This study ascertains the extent to which domestic politics and the state of the national economy are relevant factors to U.S. presidents faced with the decision to use force during international crises. The author tests a diversionary theory of the use of force that treats the relationship between politics and the use of force as nonrecursive and that considers both the incentives and the constraints faced by the president. To analyze the political economy of the use of force from 1949 to 1984, the author uses a simultaneous equations model specified with force and presidential approval as the endogenous variables. This design taps the interdependence between politics, the economy, and the decision to use force, and allows the author to assess the direct and indirect effects of the economy on uses of force. The author finds an indirect link between the economy, politics, and the use of force.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl R. DeRouen Jr., 1995. "The Indirect Link:," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 671-695, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:4:p:671-695
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039004004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ostrom, Charles W. & Job, Brian L., 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 541-566, June.
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    7. Ostrom, Charles W. & Simon, Dennis M., 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 334-358, June.
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