IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v36y1992i1p183-216.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Marinoff

    (Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia)

Abstract

This article reports the results of a computer experiment with iterated prisoner's dilemmas conducted as an interactive tournament of competing strategies and families of strategies. The purposes of the experiment are to complement Axelrod's previous tournaments and to supplement his findings. For his competitions, Axelrod drew on an unregulated population of strategies. In contrast, the interactive tournament regulates the composition of the strategic population itself. By grouping the competing strategies into families, whose members are related in certain ways, the performance characteristics of particular strategies are studied by varying parameters in their familial program logic. By this means, optimal strategic performance can be “bred†into domesticated populations. Two new methods are developed for assessing strategic robustness: combinatorial analysis and eliminatory ecosystemic competition. The strategy that maximizes expected utility with the most cooperative initial weighting is found to be most robust in the interactive environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Marinoff, 1992. "Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 183-216, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:1:p:183-216
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036001007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002792036001007
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002792036001007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    2. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    3. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    5. Wong, Kit Pong, 2008. "Does market demand volatility facilitate collusion?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 696-703, July.
    6. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    7. Helmuts Azacis & David R Collie, 2018. "Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 173-188, October.
    8. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    9. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    10. Salvatore Piccolo & Aldo Pignataro, 2016. "Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion," CSEF Working Papers 457, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    12. Jochen Streb, 1999. "How to Win Schumpeterian Competition: Technological Transfers in the German Plastics Industry from the 1930s to the 1970s," Working Papers 811, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    13. Claudia Ranocchia & Luca Lambertini, 2021. "Porter Hypothesis vs Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Can There Be Environmental Policies Getting Two Eggs in One Basket?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(1), pages 177-199, January.
    14. Scott Baker & Pak Yee Lee & Claudio Mezzetti, 2011. "Intellectual property disclosure as threat," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 21-38, March.
    15. Peter S. Fader & John R. Hauser, 1988. "Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 553-582, September.
    16. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
    17. Emilie Dargaud, 2006. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Post-Print halshs-00140139, HAL.
    18. Fischer, Carolyn, 2011. "Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 212-230, January.
    19. Cheng, Harrison, 2001. "Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: an example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-8, December.
    20. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011. "Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:1:p:183-216. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.