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Rational Theories of Participation

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  • Louise G. White

    (School of Government and Public Administration American University)

Abstract

In assessing the usefulness of economic models for political analysis, it is necessary to begin by defining the elements in the models. The present study looks at various ways to define “utility†or the goals of political activity, and how to operationalize the difference between private and public goals. Only when these are made precise can economic models be useful in predicting when and why people will act on their interests in politics. Some research is presented to explore the merits of different definitions of utility. The conclusion drawn is that economic models are most useful when they work with limited and clearly specified definitions of goals for political activity. In this way they can perform a predictive and diagnostic function. At the same time, it is likely that substantive changes in our collective life will have to emerge from other models of human behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Louise G. White, 1976. "Rational Theories of Participation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(2), pages 255-278, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:20:y:1976:i:2:p:255-278
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277602000204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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