Incentive mechanism based on Stackelberg game under reputation constraint for mobile crowdsensing
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DOI: 10.1177/15501477211023010
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Keywords
Stackelberg game; mobile crowdsensing; historical reputation; optimal response strategy; incentive mechanism;All these keywords.
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