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Mobile edge computing resource allocation: A joint Stackelberg game and matching strategy

Author

Listed:
  • Shaoyong Guo
  • Xing Hu
  • Gangsong Dong
  • Wencui Li
  • Xuesong Qiu

Abstract

Mobile edge computing has attracted great interests in the popularity of fifth-generation (5G) networks and Internet of Things. It aims to supply low-latency and high-interaction services for delay-sensitive applications. Utilizing mobile edge computing with Smart Home, which is one of the most important fields of Internet of Things, is a method to satisfy users’ demand for higher computing power and storage capacity. However, due to limited computing resource, how to improve efficiency of resource allocation is a challenge. In this article, we propose a hierarchical architecture in Smart Home with mobile edge computing, providing low-latency services and promoting edge process for smart devices. Based on that, a Stackelberg Game is designed in order to allocate computing resource to devices efficiently. Then, one-to-many matching is established to handle resource allocation problems. It is proved that the allocation strategy can optimize the utility of mobile edge computing server and improve allocating efficiency. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed strategy compared with schemes based on auction game, and present performance with different changing system parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Shaoyong Guo & Xing Hu & Gangsong Dong & Wencui Li & Xuesong Qiu, 2019. "Mobile edge computing resource allocation: A joint Stackelberg game and matching strategy," International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, , vol. 15(7), pages 15501477198, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intdis:v:15:y:2019:i:7:p:1550147719861556
    DOI: 10.1177/1550147719861556
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Briytone Mutichiro & Younghan Kim, 2021. "User preference–based QoS-aware service function placement in IoT-Edge cloud," International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, , vol. 17(5), pages 15501477211, May.

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