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How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009

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  • Tiffany D Barnes

    (University of Kentucky, USA)

  • Jinhyeok Jang

    (University of Louisville, USA)

Abstract

In presidential democracies, minority governments are widespread and the size of the governing coalition varies dramatically across legislatures. Despite substantial variation across legislatures, no significant research has been conducted to explore how the size of the governing coalition shapes legislative behavior. We argue that executives supported by a legislative majority have the necessary resources to promote the party; consequently, members of the governing coalition are subject to less partisan pressure. However, as the size of the governing coalition decreases, so does the executive’s political capital; thus, party leaders are required to exert party discipline to convalesce the party’s image. Using a unique comparative research design from Argentine provincial legislatures over an 18-year period, we provide strong empirical support for our theory of the conditional effect of inter-branch relations on legislative behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Tiffany D Barnes & Jinhyeok Jang, 2016. "How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 19(4), pages 301-319, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:19:y:2016:i:4:p:301-319
    DOI: 10.1177/2233865916667867
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    References listed on IDEAS

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