IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/intare/v13y2010i3p145-165.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Varieties of State in the International Political Economy of Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Ji-Hyang Jang

Abstract

This paper discusses varieties of state and their salience for prosperity by challenging the notions of decline of nation-states and demise of national diversity in international political economy. Despite the fact that increased international trade and capital movement raises the proportion of each economy exposed to world market pressures, domestic institutions have considerable resilience in the face of global constraints. State capacity and strength generally refers to an ability based on highly centralized authority to protect policy formulation and implementation apparatus from capture by particular private interests. Autonomous states do not damage public goods avoiding policy distortions which reduce total national welfare. However, this study contends that accountable engagement of state is also a crucial component of state capacity in addition to autonomous insulation. Furthermore, since the capacity level of states differs, the ability to exploit new opportunities appears much more marked in some countries than in others. Given the varieties and specificities of state, both parasitic and the Anglo-Saxon states fall into weak states. Yet, the former is because of low accountability level, whereas the latter is due to low insulation level. On the other hand, both the East Asian developmental and the Nordic states are categorized as strong states. However, the former holds higher insulation, and thus bargaining process is leaded by the interventionist state which only invites state-controlled business associations. The latter, in turn, possesses more widespread accountability, and therefore bargaining encompasses both business and labor peak organizations. The Nordic states, in fact, sustain complex but stable triangular industrial relations through institutionalized consultative mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ji-Hyang Jang, 2010. "Varieties of State in the International Political Economy of Developing Countries," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 145-165, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:13:y:2010:i:3:p:145-165
    DOI: 10.1177/223386591001300308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/223386591001300308
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/223386591001300308?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 595-632, October.
    2. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    3. Gowa, Joanne, 1988. "Public goods and political institutions: trade and monetary policy processes in the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 15-32, January.
    4. Haggard, Stephan, 1988. "The institutional foundations of hegemony: explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 91-119, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dreher, Axel & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 326-348, September.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    4. Andres, Javier & Domenech, Rafael & Fatas, Antonio, 2008. "The stabilizing role of government size," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 571-593, February.
    5. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Jan Schumacher, 2006. "Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(3), pages 426-444, Autumn.
    6. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr, 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 149-180, July.
    7. Eloi Laurent & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2006. "Integrity and Efficiency in the EU: The Case against the European economic constitution," Working Papers hal-00972707, HAL.
    8. World Bank, 2005. "Dominica : OECS Fiscal Issues, Policies to Achieve Fiscal Sustainability and Improve Efficiency and Equity of Public Expenditures," World Bank Publications - Reports 8681, The World Bank Group.
    9. Janus, Thorsten & Riera-Crichton, Daniel, 2015. "Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 32-44.
    10. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 829-842.
    11. Bourguignon, Francois, 2005. "The Effect of Economic Growth on Social Structures," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 27, pages 1701-1747, Elsevier.
    12. Krishna, Pravin & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2013. "Comparative advantage, complexity, and volatility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 314-329.
    13. Bouton, Laurent & Gassner, Marjorie & Verardi, Vincenzo, 2008. "Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 317-328, June.
    14. Ant—nio Afonso & Ludger Schuknecht & Vito Tanzi, 2023. "The size of government," Chapters, in: António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles & Ana Venâncio (ed.), Handbook on Public Sector Efficiency, chapter 1, pages 6-31, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Peichl, Andreas, 2012. "Automatic stabilizers and economic crisis: US vs. Europe," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 279-294.
    16. Godin, M. & Hindriks, J., 2015. "A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    17. Alessandro Federici & Pierluigi Montalbano, 2012. "Macroeconomic volatility, consumption behaviour and welfare: A cross-country analysis," Working Paper Series 3612, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    18. Alesina, Alberto & Devleeschauwer, Arnaud & Easterly, William & Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg, Romain, 2003. "Fractionalization," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 155-194, June.
    19. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2082 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Rodrik, Dani & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2001. "Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 57-73, June.
    21. Sobhee, S. K. & Joysuree, V., 2004. "The Implications of Openness for WAGNER’S Law. An International Comparison of 20 Countries, 1971-2000," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 4(3).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:13:y:2010:i:3:p:145-165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.hufs.ac.kr/user/hufsenglish/re_1.jsp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.