Gender Bias in Resource Allocation in India: Where do Household Models and Empirical Evidence Intersect?

This paper attempts to examine whether the predictions of the neo-classical economic models concerning intra-household resource allocation converge or conflict with the empirical findings on gender bias in resource allocation in India. While differentials in resource allocation are consistent with unitary models, biases and conflicts in resource allocation are not. Also, they suggest that women's earnings may enhance their well-being as a part of a rise in household welfare. Bargaining models and em pirical studies acknowledge the scope for, as well as the prevalence of, conflicts and gender bias in resource allocation. Further, both bargaining models and empirical studies suggest that women's earnings and education may enhance their bargaining power and thereby lead to favourable resource allocation. Thus, both have some amount of convergence. However, both models assume away the differences in individuals' interests and abilities, and their impingement on resource allocation decisions. Further, both models undermine the varying influence of sociocultural norms on household members in terms of hierarchy, power and resource allocation. Convergence and con flict have policy and welfare implications.