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The Paradox of Sanctions Regime in Sudan

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  • Ruth Bolline Aluoch

Abstract

The utility of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is most often marred by controversies, misinterpretations and misrepresentation. Underlining the debate is the question of functionality, efficacy and effectiveness which creates a limbo among scholars and policy makers. This predicament has created a perception where debates on sanctions are seen to have little, if any, relevance to policy makers. First, because sanctions are embodied within international laws whose enforceability is pegged on national interests. Second, in the context of sovereign states’ foreign policy, which are premised on an individual country’s national objectives. Furthermore, scholarly debates address different questions substantiated by ideological, theoretical and circumstantial appropriations among realists, liberals and idealists. This article examines the paradox of sanctions in the prism of Sudan under the utilitarian ethical theory. While acknowledging its utility through a conceptual analysis and chronological application it argues that in the broader picture the sanctions against Sudan have profound political, social and economic implications on the state of Sudan, defeating the overall purpose of utility. As such it makes recommendations for their lifting and strengthening of ongoing diplomatic processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Bolline Aluoch, 2015. "The Paradox of Sanctions Regime in Sudan," Insight on Africa, , vol. 7(1), pages 71-83, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:inafri:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:71-83
    DOI: 10.1177/0975087814554071
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jan Grebe, 2010. "And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe," Africa Spectrum, Institute of African Affairs, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 45(1), pages 3-29.
    2. Drezner, Daniel W., 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 643-659, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nyoni, Thabani, 2019. "The curse is real in Zimbabwe: economic sanctions must go!," MPRA Paper 96911, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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