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Local Authority Size in Theory and Practice

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  • David N King
  • Yue Ma

Abstract

In this paper we develop a model for local authority size that is based on the approach towards local government reform that was used by the UK governments in the 1970s and the 1990s. To do so, we examine the different aspects of costs for local services, the minimum cost size facility used to provide local services, and the minimum efficient size for a local authority. We then argue that, for a given level of service, the belief that a tendency for local authorities to become enablers rather than producers would reduce the minimum efficient size of authority may not be correct. Finally, the model is developed to determine simultaneously the optimum quantity of local services and the minimum efficient size. It shows that the solution depends on how preferences vary among different citizens, and argues that governments paid too little heed to these variations. Thus we conclude that it is very doubtful whether either the 1970s or the 1990s reforms produced the structure of local government that would have emerged if the approach adopted by the governments concerned had been used with more care.

Suggested Citation

  • David N King & Yue Ma, 2000. "Local Authority Size in Theory and Practice," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 18(3), pages 255-270, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:envirc:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:255-270
    DOI: 10.1068/c9856
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    6. David N King & Yue Ma, 2000. "Local Authority Provision versus Club Provision," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 18(2), pages 207-223, April.
    7. D N King, 1994. "A Model of Optimum Local Authority Size," Working Papers Series 94/1, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Albert Solé-Ollé & Núria Bosch, 2005. "On the Relationship between Authority Size and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(3), pages 343-384, May.
    2. Rhys Andrews, 2012. "Local Government Size and Efficiency in Labour Intensive Public Services: Evidence from Local Educational Authorities in England," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1214, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    3. David N King & Yue Ma, 2000. "Local Authority Provision versus Club Provision," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 18(2), pages 207-223, April.
    4. Sabrina Iommi & Donatella Marinari, 2016. "Frammentazione comunale e spesa pubblica: una proposta di aggregazione sui sistemi locali del lavoro," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(1), pages 107-136.
    5. Fukushige Mototsugu & Yingxin Shi, 2016. "Efficient scale of prefectural government in China," China Finance and Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 88-109.
    6. Mototsugu Fukushige & Yingxin Shi, 2014. "Efficient Scale of Local Government in China: Quantile Regression Approach to County-Level Data," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 14-15, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Heinesen, Eskil, 2005. "School district size and student educational attainment: evidence from Denmark," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 677-689, December.
    8. Rhys Andrews, 2015. "Vertical consolidation and financial sustainability: evidence from English local government," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 33(6), pages 1518-1545, December.
    9. Rhys Andrews, 2013. "Local government size and efficiency in labor-intensive public services: evidence from local educational authorities in England," Chapters, in: Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Challenge of Local Government Size, chapter 7, pages 171-188, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Rhys Andrews & George A. Boyne, 2009. "Size, Structure and Administrative Overheads: An Empirical Analysis of English Local Authorities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 46(4), pages 739-759, April.

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