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Decentralised Cross-Border Interconnection

Author

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  • Claude Crampes
  • Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr

Abstract

Reaping the full benefits from cross-border interconnection typically requires reinforcement of national networks. When the relevant parts of the networks are complements, a lack of coordination between national transmission system operators results in investment below optimal levels in both interconnectors and national infrastructure. A subsidy to financially sustain interconnector building is not sufficient to restore optimality; indeed, even when possible, such subsidisation may have to be restrained so as not to encourage cross-border capacities that will not be fully utilised due to lack of investment in national systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Crampes & Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr, 2023. "Decentralised Cross-Border Interconnection," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(4), pages 147-169, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:44:y:2023:i:4:p:147-169
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.4.ccra
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    Cited by:

    1. Pollitt, Michael G. & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M. & Willems, Bert & Banet, Catherine & Le Coq, Chloé & Chyong, Chi Kong, 2024. "Recommendations for a future-proof electricity market design in Europe in light of the 2021-23 energy crisis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electrical grid; Interconnector; Externality; Regulation; Regional cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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