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Why vote when you cannot choose? EU intervention and political participation in times of constraint

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  • Stuart J Turnbull-Dugarte

Abstract

This article analyses how economic intervention affects individuals’ political behaviour by assessing the impact of intervention on aggregate and individual turnout. The intervention of the European Union in a selection of member states is viewed as having negative consequences for democratic choice, reducing the ability of voters to select between distinct policy alternatives, resulting in the absence of the primary benefit of voting: choice. It is argued that when voters are faced with electoral choices without the ability to shape policy alternatives, they are less likely to vote. Moreover, the negative effect of intervention is found to be conditioned by both individuals’ level of education and ideological identification. Voters on the centre and the left who feel abandoned by left-leaning parties, who have prioritised being responsible to their European paymasters, are significantly more likely to abstain when exposed to intervention. Empirical support for the argument is found via the analysis of aggregate turnout as well as individual level data from the European Social Survey from across fifteen Western European states.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart J Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020. "Why vote when you cannot choose? EU intervention and political participation in times of constraint," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 406-428, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:21:y:2020:i:3:p:406-428
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116520910476
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    References listed on IDEAS

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