IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v16y2015i3p408-428.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Signalling ‘compliance’: The link between notified EU directive implementation and infringement cases

Author

Listed:
  • Asya Zhelyazkova
  • Nikoleta Yordanova

Abstract

Research on member states’ compliance with European Union legislation often focuses on the timing of self-reported implementation measures. It is generally assumed that the earlier a member state adopts an implementation measure the more compliant it is. This is problematic because early measures may only partially address the goals of a European Union directive. We study whether and when reporting national legislation to signal directive implementation is associated with detected non-compliance by the European Commission. We find that unless facing strong reputational costs, member states often do report pre-existing measures of low fit to a given directive without making timely adjustments. Indicating compliance problems, this generally leads to the European Commission opening infringement cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Asya Zhelyazkova & Nikoleta Yordanova, 2015. "Signalling ‘compliance’: The link between notified EU directive implementation and infringement cases," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 408-428, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:16:y:2015:i:3:p:408-428
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116515576394
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116515576394
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116515576394?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. König, Thomas & Luetgert, Brooke, 2009. "Troubles with Transposition? Explaining Trends in Member-State Notification and the Delayed Transposition of EU Directives," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 163-194, January.
    2. Markus Haverland & Bernard Steunenberg & Frans Van Waarden, 2011. "Sectors at Different Speeds: Analysing Transposition Deficits in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 265-291, March.
    3. Kaeding, Michael, 2006. "Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 229-253, December.
    4. Miriam Hartlapp & Gerda Falkner, 2009. "Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 281-304, June.
    5. Knill, Christoph & Tosun, Jale, 2009. "Post-accession transposition of EU law in the new member states: a cross-country comparison," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 13, December.
    6. Tallberg, Jonas, 2002. "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 609-643, July.
    7. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    8. Thomson, Robert & Torenvlied, René & Arregui, Javier, 2007. "The Paradox of Compliance: Infringements and Delays in Transposing European Union Directives," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(4), pages 685-709, October.
    9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas König & Lars Mäder, 2013. "Non-conformable, partial and conformable transposition: A competing risk analysis of the transposition process of directives in the EU15," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 46-69, March.
    2. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.
    3. Miriam Hartlapp & Gerda Falkner, 2009. "Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 281-304, June.
    4. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2019. "The evolution of European Union law: A new data set on the Acquis Communautaire," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 670-691, December.
    5. Robert Thomson, 2010. "Opposition through the back door in the transposition of EU directives," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 577-596, December.
    6. Stine Aakre & Jon Hovi, 2010. "Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance enforcement," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 427-445, September.
    7. Ruud van Druenen & Pieter Zwaan & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2022. "Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 545-561, May.
    8. Alves, Amanda M. & Brousseau, Eric & Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong, 2021. "The dynamics of institution building: State aids, the European commission, and the court of justice of the European Union," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 836-859.
    9. Dimiter Toshkov, 2008. "Embracing European Law," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(3), pages 379-402, September.
    10. Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," CESifo Working Paper Series 9033, CESifo.
    11. Thomas de Haan & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2015. "Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation Of Cheap Talk And Burned Money," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1385-1426, November.
    12. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2019. "Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-20.
    13. Kimmo Eriksson & Brent Simpson, 2007. "Deception and price in a market with asymmetric information," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 2, pages 23-28, February.
    14. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2016. "Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 547-567, December.
    15. Chakravarty, Sugato & Jain, Pankaj & Upson, James & Wood, Robert, 2012. "Clean Sweep: Informed Trading through Intermarket Sweep Orders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 415-435, April.
    16. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    17. Lohse, Johannes & McDonald, Rebecca, 2021. "Absolute groupishness and the demand for information," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242454, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Burro, Giovanni & Castagnetti, Alessandro, 2024. "The ego is no fool: Absence of motivated belief formation in strategic interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    19. Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.
    20. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021. "An experiment on deception, reputation and trust," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 821-853, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:16:y:2015:i:3:p:408-428. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.