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Domestic diversion and strategic behavior by minority groups

Author

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  • Carla Martinez Machain

    (Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, USA)

  • Leo Rosenberg

    (Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, USA)

Abstract

Diversionary war theory states that leaders may initiate an international conflict in order to invoke internal cohesion and distract the public from domestic issues. Recent developments in diversionary literature suggest the possibility that leaders can alternately divert against domestic targets, such as minority groups. Empirical support for domestic diversion, though, has been mixed. In this paper we seek to reconcile this by further examining the different dynamics at play between actors who are faced with diversionary incentives. We suggest that a major reason why we do not observe many cases of domestic diversion is strategic behavior by minority groups. Much like states do, minority groups that are potential targets of repression engage in strategic conflict avoidance when they observe diversionary incentives to be present. We test our theory through a multivariate probit model that uses the state–minority group dyad as the unit of analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Carla Martinez Machain & Leo Rosenberg, 2018. "Domestic diversion and strategic behavior by minority groups," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 427-450, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:5:p:427-450
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894216655461
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    References listed on IDEAS

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