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The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace1

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Listed:
  • Kelly M. Kadera

    (University of Iowa, Iowa City Iowa, USA)

  • Daniel S. Morey

    (University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky, USA, daniel-morey@uky.edu)

Abstract

International competition occurs in many different forms. Just as a state would be in danger if it allowed its opponent to gain a military advantage, one that falls behind a rival in an economic contest similarly faces risks. States must weigh the trade-offs between economic and military growth, as well as deciding on the best strategy to follow should war erupt. We use a formal, dynamic model to explicitly capture the trade-offs that states face in their search for security and dominance. The deductions from the model demonstrate that by considering the long-run results of a peacetime rivalry, weaker states might conclude that their only hope of winning or surviving a rivalry lies in fighting a counterforce war, explain why and how stalemates evolve during counterforce wars, and indicate that targeting industrial objectives shortens the duration of wars.

Suggested Citation

  • Kelly M. Kadera & Daniel S. Morey, 2008. "The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace1," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(2), pages 152-170, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:25:y:2008:i:2:p:152-170
    DOI: 10.1080/07388940802007272
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Organski, A.F.K. & Kugler, Jacek, 1977. "The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1347-1366, December.
    2. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 169-203, January.
    3. Zeev Maoz & Randolph M. Siverson, 2008. "Bargaining, Domestic Politics, and International Context in the Management of War: A Review Essay," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(2), pages 171-189, April.
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