On a Theorem due to Alan D. Taylor about Aggregation of Preferences
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DOI: 10.1177/0976747918792639
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent Second Edition," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 2, number 9742.
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- Somdeb Lahiri & Prasanta K. Pattanaik, 2017. "A Note on A. D. Taylor’s Property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives for Voting Rules," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(2), pages 99-104, December.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Preference aggregation rule; triple acyclic; independence of irrelevant alternatives; social welfare function; preference aggregation functional;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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