The Consequences of Overstating Fuel Economy
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DOI: 10.1177/056943451506000105
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Other versions of this item:
- David Schap & Cory Beck, 2015. "The Consequences of Overstating Fuel Economy," Working Papers 1514, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- De Alessi, Louis & Staaf, Robert J, 1994. "What Does Reputation Really Assure? The Relationship of Trademarks to Expectations and Legal Remedies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(3), pages 477-485, July.
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Keywords
law and economics; contract law; specific performance; breach; damages; trademark; brand name capital; Environmental Protection Agency; gas mileage; Hyundai Elantra;All these keywords.
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