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The new institutional economics - main theories

Author

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  • Emilia Obiñska-Wajda

    (University of Warsaw)

Abstract

The aim of this arti cle is to show that the New Insti tuti onal Economics is an interdisciplinary stream combining economics, law, organizati on theory, politi cal sciences, sociology, and anthropology. The main theories which are part of the New Insti tuti onal Economics are: Agency Theory, Property Rights Theory and Transaction Costs Theory. The basic assumptions of these theories are mentioned in this paper. This article is an introduction to the New Institutional Economics and its main theories. For this purpose, it presents a brief guide for those who are interested in the New Institutional Economics. Finally, the article is accompanied by a short review of examples of empirical studies connected with these theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilia Obiñska-Wajda, 2016. "The new institutional economics - main theories," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 12(1), pages 78-85, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:rze:efinan:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:78-85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Libecap, Gary D., 1986. "Property rights in economic history: Implications for research," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 227-252, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency Theory; the New Insti tuti onal Economics; transacti on costs; property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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