IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rvr/journl/201511143.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Médicaments génériques : pivot de la reconstruction de l’industrie pharmaceutique

Author

Listed:
  • Abecassis, Philippe
  • Coutinet, Nathalie

Abstract

Les enjeux sanitaires, économiques, politiques, voire éthiques, véhiculés par le médicament confèrent une importance particulière, exemplaire même, au secteur pharmaceutique. En conséquence, le médicament fait l’objet de multiples et complexes réglementations, tant nationales qu’internationales. Si certaines de ces réglementations ont été échafaudées à l’encontre des grandes firmes pharmaceutiques (big pharma), ces dernières les ont le plus souvent co-construites avec l’intention d’en tirer avantage. L’analyse de l’évolution des modèles de production et des stratégies successives adoptés par les big pharma permet de mettre en évidence l’importance de cette co-construction de la régulation de ce secteur. Ce travail montre par ce biais que le modèle « génériques » de production des médicaments qui succède au modèle « blockbusters », apparaît comme un modèle transitoire, un pivot que les firmes cherchent à dépasser le plus rapidement possible, encouragées en cela par les autorités de régulation, pour retrouver un nouveau modèle, qualifié de custom blockbusters ou « custombusters », exempt des défauts de son prédécesseur.

Suggested Citation

  • Abecassis, Philippe & Coutinet, Nathalie, 2015. "Médicaments génériques : pivot de la reconstruction de l’industrie pharmaceutique," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11143
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/11143
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/pdf/11143
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benjamin Coriat & Fabienne Orsi & Cristina d'Almeida, 2006. "TRIPS and the international public health controversies: issues and challenges," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 15(6), pages 1033-1062, December.
    2. Jaffe, Adam B., 2000. "The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 531-557, April.
    3. Elise Verpillot, 2009. "La tarification au prix de référence : quel impact sur le marché pharmaceutique ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(5), pages 795-816.
    4. Koenig, Pamina & MacGarvie, Megan, 2011. "Regulatory policy and the location of bio-pharmaceutical foreign direct investment in Europe," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 950-965.
    5. Mats A. Bergman & Niklas Rudholm, 2003. "The Relative Importance of Actual and Potential Competition: Empirical Evidence From the Pharmaceuticals Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 455-467, December.
    6. Samira Guennif, 2012. "L'économie politique du brevet au Sud : dimensions industrielle et sanitaire," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 85-98.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giovanni Dosi & Joseph Stiglitz, 2013. "The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process, with Some Lessons from Developed Countries: An Introduction," LEM Papers Series 2013/23, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Shiyuan Pan & Heng-fu Zou & Tailong Li, 2010. "Patent Protection, Technological Change and Wage Inequality," CEMA Working Papers 437, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    3. von Graevenitz, Georg & Wagner, Stefan & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2011. "How to measure patent thickets--A novel approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 6-9, April.
    4. Penin, Julien, 2005. "Patents versus ex post rewards: A new look," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 641-656, June.
    5. Iván Moreno Torres & Jaume Puig & Joan-Ramon Borrell-Arqué, 2007. "Generic entry into a regulated pharmaceutical market," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 1014, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Jinyoung Kim & Gerald Marschke, 2004. "Accounting for the recent surge in U.S. patenting: changes in R&D expenditures, patent yields, and the high tech sector," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(6), pages 543-558.
    7. Julien Pénin, 2013. "Devrait-on obliger les entreprises à investir en R&D ? Vers une approche des politiques d’innovation par la responsabilité des entreprises," Working Papers of BETA 2013-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Patricia M. Danzon & Eric L. Keuffel, 2014. "Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology Industry," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 407-484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Joel Blit & Mauricio Zelaya, 2015. "Do Firms Respond to Stronger Patent Protection by Doing More R&D?," Working Papers 1501, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2015.
    10. Brekke, Kurt R. & Holmas, Tor Helge & Straume, Odd Rune, 2011. "Reference pricing, competition, and pharmaceutical expenditures: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 624-638.
    11. Anja, Breitwieser & Neil, Foster, 2012. "Intellectual property rights, innovation and technology transfer: a survey," MPRA Paper 36094, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2007. "Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices: Theory and Evidence," Umeå Economic Studies 709, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    13. Wang, Jun, 2023. "Motivations for the restructuring of China’s patent court system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Markus Lampe & Paul Sharp, 2014. "Greasing the wheels of rural transformation? Margarine and the competition for the British butter market," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(3), pages 769-792, August.
    15. Brekke, Kurt Richard & Holmås, Tor Helge & Straume, Odd Rune, 2013. "Margins and market shares: Pharmacy incentives for generic substitution," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 116-131.
    16. Ayadi, Inès, 2009. "Impact de la réforme de l’assurance maladie en Tunisie sur l’offre et la demande des médicaments," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7671 edited by Joël, Marie-Eve & Boujelbene, Younès.
    17. Montobbio, Fabio & Sterzi, Valerio, 2013. "The Globalization of Technology in Emerging Markets: A Gravity Model on the Determinants of International Patent Collaborations," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 281-299.
    18. Acosta, Manuel & Coronado, Daniel & Martínez, M. Angeles, 2018. "Does technological diversification spur university patenting?," MPRA Paper 123316, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Koo, Bonwoo & Pardey, Philip G. & Qian, Keming & Zhang, Yi, 2003. "The economics of generating and maintaining plant variety rights in China:," EPTD discussion papers 100, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    20. Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2010. "How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Relations between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation," Chapters, in: Riccardo Viale & Henry Etzkowitz (ed.), The Capitalization of Knowledge, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    industrie pharmaceutique; politique de santé; régulation du secteur des médicaments; médicaments génériques; big pharma; pharmaceutical industry; health policy; drug market regulation; generics; big pharma; industria farmacéutica; política de salud; regulación del sector de medicamentos; medicamentos genéricos; big pharma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • I - Health, Education, and Welfare
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Pascal Seppecher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://theorie-regulation.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.