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Devrait-on obliger les entreprises à investir en R&D ? Vers une approche des politiques d’innovation par la responsabilité des entreprises

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  • Julien Pénin

Abstract

Les investissements en R&D des entreprises sont sources d’externalités positives, justifiant ainsi les politiques d’innovation basées sur un mélange de subventions à la recherche et de propriété intellectuelle. Ces deux instruments correspondent à une manière d’encourager les entreprises qui investissent en R&D en les récompensant. Nous montrons dans cet article qu’une autre philosophie des politiques d’innovation est envisageable. En suivant la logique avancée par Coase (1960), le problème d’externalités positives de R&D est un problème de nature réciproque. Aussi, plutôt que de postuler qu’il faut récompenser les innovateurs, il est également possible de considérer qu’il est du devoir des entreprises d’investir en R&D. Cette nouvelle approche insiste sur la responsabilité des entreprises en matière d’innovation. Cela permet alors de discuter de deux mesures originales de politiques publiques d’incitation à la R&D : un système de « droits échangeables à ne pas investir en R&D » (ou alternativement « d’obligations échangeables à investir en R&D ») et un système basé sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Pénin, 2013. "Devrait-on obliger les entreprises à investir en R&D ? Vers une approche des politiques d’innovation par la responsabilité des entreprises," Working Papers of BETA 2013-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2013-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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