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Tools and Methods for Resistance to Unfair Execution of a Government Contract
[Инстурменты И Методы Противодействия Недобросовестному Исполнению Государственного Контракта]

Author

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  • Makovleva, Ekaterina (Маковлева, Екатерина)

    (JSC Sberbank-AST)

Abstract

The article deals with a wide range of issues related to the execution of contracts intended to meet state and municipal needs. The paper analyzes the key factors influencing the execution of a contract at various stages of the procurement process. Procurement risks are divided into four groups, which correspond to pre-contract preparation, the procurement procedure, post-contractual relations and the competence of the parties in the context of constantly changing legislation. In order to identify the proportion of ineffective purchases, an analysis of quantitative indicators for canceled contracts and accrued penalties was made. To describe the process of interaction between the parties at the stage of contract execution, a general model of post-contract opportunism is constructed. The applicability of said model in the field of public procurement is examined to assess the level of the supplier’s efforts to ensure the proper quality of execution of obligations, taking into account suppliers’ costs and possible sanctions from the customer. The analysis of these sanctions, provided for by Russian legislation, indicates mainly the use of punitive measures against the opportunist performer, applied after the discovery of the corresponding violation. The article considers three main types of contracts used in international practice: the fixed-price contract, the costreimbursement contract, and the incentive contract; the advantages and disadvantages of each of them are indicated. In conclusion of the article, a set of tools and methods to counteract opportunist execution of the contracts is presented, and a summary of the study results is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Makovleva, Ekaterina (Маковлева, Екатерина), 2018. "Tools and Methods for Resistance to Unfair Execution of a Government Contract [Инстурменты И Методы Противодействия Недобросовестному Исполнению Государственного Контракта]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 62-81, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1822
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contract; contract system; public procurement; contract performance; postcontractual opportunism.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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