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Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust

Author

Listed:
  • Manne, Geoffrey

    (Lewis & Clark College)

  • Wright, Joshua

    (Lewis & Clark College)

Abstract

Frank Easterbrook’s seminal analysis of error-cost minimization in «The Limits of Antitrust» has special relevance to antitrust intervention in markets where innovation is a critical dimension of competition. The authors discuss some principles for applying Easterbrook’s error-cost framework to innovation. Then they discuss the historical relationship between antitrust error and innovation. They conclude by challenging the conventional wisdom that the error-cost approach implies that the rule of reason, rather than per se rules, should apply to most forms of business conduct. Instead one must identify simple filters to harness existing economic knowledge to design simple rules that minimize error costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Manne, Geoffrey & Wright, Joshua, 2011. "Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:1117
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Liebowitz, S J & Margolis, Stephen E, 1990. "The Fable of the Keys," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-25, April.
    2. Richard Gilbert, 2007. "Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    3. Daniel F. Spulber, 2008. "Consumer Coordination In The Small And In The Large: Implications For Antitrust In Markets With Network Effects," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 207-262.
    4. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty, 2021. "Competition and Regulatory Challenges in Digital Markets: How to Tackle the Issue of Self-Preferencing?," Working Papers halshs-03227392, HAL.
    2. Andrey Shastitko & Claude Ménard & Natalia Pavlova, 2018. "The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 4(2), pages 175-196, June.
    3. Joshua Wright, 2011. "Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(4), pages 387-404, June.
    4. Zhu, Jialiang & Gu, Jinnan, 2024. "Intensified law enforcement and firm innovation: Evidence from China's antitrust consolidation," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    5. Svetlana Avdasheva & Polina Kryuchkova, 2013. "Law And Economics Of Antitrust Enforcement In Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, 2017. "The Effect of Regulation on Broadband Markets: Evaluating the Empirical Evidence in the FCC’s 2015 “Open Internet” Order," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 487-507, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; law and economics; monopolization; rule of reason;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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