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On the Interplay of Informational Spillovers and Payoff Externalities

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  • Frisell, Lars

Abstract

Informational spillovers induce agents to outwait each other's actions in order to make more-informed decisions. If waiting is costly, we expect the best-informed agent, who has the least to learn from other agents' decisions, to take the first action. I study the interplay between informational spillovers and a direct payoff externality. I show that when the payoff externality is positive or relatively weak, the above intuition is validated. On the other hand, if the externality is negative and strong, the best-informed agent has the most to gain from outwaiting the other. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.

Suggested Citation

  • Frisell, Lars, 2003. "On the Interplay of Informational Spillovers and Payoff Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 582-592, Autumn.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:3:p:582-92
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2010. "Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-10-007, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    2. Drehmann, Mathias & Oechssler, Jorg & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Herding with and without payoff externalities -- an internet experiment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 391-415, April.
    3. Lukas Meub & Till Proeger & Hendrik Hüning, 2017. "A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 143-166, April.
    4. Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive Environments," CAEPR Working Papers 2008-022, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    5. Hüning, Hendrik & Meub, Lukas, 2015. "Optimal public information dissemination: Introducing observational learning into a generalized beauty contest," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 260, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    6. Margaria, Chiara, 2020. "Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 234-250.
    7. Young-Ro Yoon, 2019. "Strategic Information Disclosure to be imitated under Informational and Payoff Externality," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 419-430.
    8. H. Dharma Kwon & Wenxin Xu & Anupam Agrawal & Suresh Muthulingam, 2016. "Impact of Bayesian Learning and Externalities on Strategic Investment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 550-570, February.
    9. Hüning, Hendrik & Meub, Lukas, 2016. "Optimal public information dissemination: Introducing multiplier effects into a generalized beauty contest," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 260 [rev.], University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    10. Edward Cartwright, 2015. "Strategic delay and information cascades," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 63-74, January.
    11. Song, Yangbo & Zhang, Jiahua, 2020. "Social learning with coordination motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 81-100.
    12. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Hüning, Hendrik, 2013. "A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 167, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    13. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2007. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Mark," CAEPR Working Papers 2007-017, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    14. Hüning, Hendrik & Meub, Lukas, 2015. "Optimal public information dissemination: Introducing observational learning into a generalized beauty contest," HWWI Research Papers 169, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    15. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets," Working Papers 2008-15, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    16. Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2012. "Rational exuberance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1220-1240.

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