Tmt Behaviour And Ways Of Firm’S Growth: Is There Any Connection?
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- Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
- Bliss, Richard T. & Rosen, Richard J., 2001. "CEO compensation and bank mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 107-138, July.
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Keywords
Firm’s growth; Top management team; M&A; Diversification;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
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