An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1993.
"Why China's economic reforms differ: the M‐form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non‐state sector,"
The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(2), pages 135-170, June.
- Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1993. "Why Chinas Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector," CEP Discussion Papers dp0154, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A model of Chinese central government," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 21(3), pages 451-477, July.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001.
"Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia,"
IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1889, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Blanchard, Olivier & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization:China Versus Russia," Scholarly Articles 30747169, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia," NBER Working Papers 7616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lin,Justin Yifu, 2009.
"Economic Development and Transition,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521514521.
- Lin,Justin Yifu, 2009. "Economic Development and Transition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521735513.
- Dasgupta, Ani & Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Designing an optimal contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 587-603, November.
- Chenggang Xu, 2011.
"The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
- Chenggang Xu, 2024. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," CEMA Working Papers 621, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005.
"Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
- Hehui Jin & Yingyi Qian & Barry Weingast, 1999. "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style," Working Papers 99013, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- John B. Knight, 2014.
"China as a Developmental State,"
The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 1335-1347, October.
- John Knight, 2012. "China as a Developmental State," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-13, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Luis Corchón & Matthias Dahm, 2010.
"Foundations for contest success functions,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 81-98, April.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "Foundations for contest success functions," Working Papers 2072/9493, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A Model of Chinese Central Government: the Role of Reciprocal Accountability," Working Papers 230, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2013.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 263-270, Springer.
- Nee, Victor & Opper, Sonja & Wong, Sonia, 2007. "Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China," Management and Organization Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 19-53, March.
- Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
- Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997.
"The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
- Timothy Frye & Andrei Shleifer, 1996. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," NBER Working Papers 5856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," Scholarly Articles 30725664, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Caldeira, Emilie, 2012.
"Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China,"
China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
- Emilie CALDEIRA, 2010. "Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China," Working Papers 201018, CERDI.
- Emilie Caldeira, 2011. "Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China," CERDI Working papers halshs-00552242, HAL.
- Emilie Caldeira, 2011. "Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China," Working Papers halshs-00552242, HAL.
- Ronald Coase & Ning Wang, 2012. "China in Transition," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: How China Became Capitalist, chapter 2, pages 22-40, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chen, Ye & Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005.
"Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 421-425, September.
- Ye Chen & Hongbin Li & Li-An Zhou, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China," Discussion Papers 00010, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
- Victor Nee & Sonja Opper & Sonia Wong, 2007. "Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China," Management and Organization Review, The International Association for Chinese Management Research, vol. 3(1), pages 19-53, March.
- Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 1993. "Why China's economic reforms differ: the m-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3755, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Shih, Victor & Adolph, Christopher & Liu, Mingxing, 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 166-187, February.
- Zhang, Yongjing, 2012. "A view from behavioral political economy on China's institutional change," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 991-1002.
- Cao, Xiaping & Pan, Xiaofei & Qian, Meijun & Tian, Gary Gang, 2017. "Political capital and CEO entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover in Chinese non-SOEs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-14.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1998. "Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 685-701, November.
- Groves, Theodore & Yongmiao Hong & John McMillan & Barry Naughton, 1995. "China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 873-892, August.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Yu, Xiaojun & Yao, Yao & Zheng, Huanhuan & Zhang, Lin, 2020. "The role of political connection on overinvestment of Chinese energy firms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
- Li, Xin & Ma, Xiaodong & Hu, Zongnan & Li, Siyuan, 2021. "Investigation of urban green space equity at the city level and relevant strategies for improving the provisioning in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
- Cailou Jiang & Rong Liu & Jie Han, 2023. "Does accountability audit of natural resource promote corporate environmental performance? An external supervision perspective," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(9), pages 9417-9438, September.
- Zhen Yang & Weijun Gao, 2022. "Evaluating the Coordinated Development between Urban Greening and Economic Growth in Chinese Cities during 2005 to 2019," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(15), pages 1-25, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Qichun He & Meng Sun, 2018. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate? Evidence from Chinese Panel Data," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 75-101, May.
- An, Heng & Chen, Yanyan & Luo, Danglun & Zhang, Ting, 2016. "Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 174-189.
- Barbara Krug & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 221-245, June.
- Chen, Ting & Kung, J.K.-S., 2016. "Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 86-106.
- Cao, Xun & Kleit, Andrew & Liu, Chuyu, 2016. "Why invest in wind energy? Career incentives and Chinese renewable energy politics," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 120-131.
- Longjin Chen & Jian Huang & Jianjun Li, 2017. "Fiscal Decentralization, Satisfaction with Social Services, and Inequality Under the Hukou System," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 377-394, May.
- Zhang, Muyang & Zhou, Guangsu & Fan, Gang, 2020. "Political Control and Economic Inequality: Evidence from Chinese Cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
- John Knight, 2015. "The Principal-Agent Problem, Economic Growth, Subjective Wellbeing and Social Instability: China’s Effective but Flawed Governance," Economics Series Working Papers 758, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Pi‐han Tsai & Jianliang Ye, 2018. "The Lame‐Duck Effect and Fiscal Policy in China," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 56(3), pages 197-220, September.
- Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022.
"Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China,"
NBER Working Papers
30780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022. "Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- He, Qichun, 2015. "Fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution: Evidence from Chinese panel data," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 86-100.
- Yuan Li, 2014. "Downward accountability in response to collective actions," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 22(1), pages 69-103, January.
- Yu Bai & Yanjun Li, 2022. "Political tournaments and regional growth‐enhancing policies: Evidence from Chinese prefectures," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1358-1385, November.
- Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin & Yang, Xi & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Tian, 2017.
"Market facilitation by local government and firm efficiency: Evidence from China,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 460-480.
- Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin & Yang, Xi & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Tian, 2013. "Market facilitation by local government and firm efficiency : evidence from China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6688, The World Bank.
- Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2019.
"Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 63-94.
- Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2015. "Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 216, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
- Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2015. "Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-026, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Yu, Jihai & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Guozhong, 2016. "Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-37.
- Wang, Boya, 2018. "Ownership, institutions and firm value: Cross-provincial evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 547-565.
- Lu Ming & Zhao Chen & Yongqin Wang & Yan Zhang & Yuan Zhang & Changyuan Luo, 2013. "China’s Economic Development," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14502.
- Li, Yuan, 2013. "Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in China," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2013-26, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute.
- Boya Wang, 2016. "Ownership, Institutions & Firm Value: Cross-Provincial Evidence from China," Working Papers wp484, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
More about this item
Keywords
political promotion; China miracle; contest success function; promotion tournament model; local official;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
- R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rfe:zbefri:v:35:y:2017:i:2:p:375-390. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Danijela Ujcic (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efrijhr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.