IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/red/issued/v7y2004i1p219-236.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mechanism Design and the Role of Enforcement in Freeman's Model of Payments

Author

Listed:
  • David C. Mills, Jr

    (Board of Governors)

Abstract

Freeman (1996a) is the first to formulate a model in which (i) debts are repaid with money and (ii) there can arise liquidity problems which give rise to a role for a central bank discount window. I ask whether this payment system is truly essential in his model. It is not because there is another mechanism - one which features (i) and (ii) - that works well. This is because of a strong assumption regarding the enforcement of debt contracts. I then present a slightly different model of enforcement based on collateralized lending where (i) is necessary, but (ii) is not. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • David C. Mills, Jr, 2004. "Mechanism Design and the Role of Enforcement in Freeman's Model of Payments," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(1), pages 219-236, january.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:219-236
    DOI: 10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00045-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00045-0
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and ScienceDirect institutional members. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00045-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Freeman, Scott, 1999. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 197-216, February.
    2. Ruilin Zhou, 2000. "Understanding intraday credit in large-value payment systems," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 25(Q III), pages 29-44.
    3. Edward J. Green, 1999. "Money and debt in the structure of payments," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 23(Spr), pages 13-29.
    4. Huggett, Mark & Krasa, Stefan, 1996. "Money and Storage in a Differential Information Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 191-210, August.
    5. N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
    2. Tomura, Hajime, 2018. "Payment instruments and collateral in the interbank payment system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 82-104.
    3. James T.E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 651-674, June.
    4. Gu, Chao & Guzman, Mark & Haslag, Joseph, 2011. "Production, hidden action, and the payment system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 172-182, March.
    5. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2007. "Transferability, finality, and debt settlement," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 955-978, May.
    6. ANTOINE MARTIN & JAMES McANDREWS, 2010. "Should There Be Intraday Money Markets?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 110-122, January.
    7. Mills, David Jr., 2006. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1611, October.
    8. Hiroshi FUJIKI, 2016. "Nontraditional Monetary Policy in a Model of Default Risks and Collateral in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers e104, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    9. Jonathan Chiu & Alexandra Lai, 2007. "Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature," Staff Working Papers 07-28, Bank of Canada.
    10. Camera, Gabriele & Vesely, Filip, 2007. "Trading horizons and the value of money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(7), pages 1751-1767, October.
    11. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
    2. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2001. "Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 299-319, April.
    3. Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2006. "The economics of payments," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb.
    4. James T.E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 651-674, June.
    5. Hajime Tomura, 2021. "Nominal contracts and the payment system," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 185-216, April.
    6. Paula Hernandez-Verme, 2009. "International Reserves Crises, Monetary Integration and the Payments System during the International Gold Standard," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200904, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance.
    7. James J. McAndrews & William Roberds, 1999. "Payment intermediation and the origins of banking," Staff Reports 85, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1999. "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random-Matching Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 929-945, October.
    9. Huberto M. Ennis & John A. Weinberg, 2007. "Interest on reserves and daylight credit," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 93(Spr), pages 111-142.
    10. Kahn, Charles M & Roberds, William, 1998. "Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(4), pages 845-870.
    11. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
    12. Dwyer Jr., Gerald P. & Samartín, Margarita, 2009. "Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-169, June.
    13. Simon Buckle & Erin Campbell, 2003. "Settlement bank behaviour and throughput rules in an RTGS payment system with collateralised intraday credit," Bank of England working papers 209, Bank of England.
    14. Martin, Antoine, 2004. "Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 401-424, March.
    15. Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Weinberg, John A., 2003. "Payment economics: studying the mechanics of exchange," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-387, March.
    16. Mills, David Jr., 2006. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1611, October.
    17. Loewy Michael B., 2003. "``To Furnish an Elastic Currency'': Banking, Aggregate Risk, and Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-19, March.
    18. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "On Separation between Payment and Saving Instruments," Working Papers 1813, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    19. Temzelides, Ted & Williamson, Stephen D., 2001. "Payments Systems Design in Deterministic and Private Information Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 297-326, July.
    20. Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Payments system; discount window;

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:219-236. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.