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The Welfare Effects of Mobility Restrictions

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  • Byeongju Jeong

    (CERGE-EI)

Abstract

Mobility restrictions (e.g., severance payment, life-long tenure, and divorce ban) are widely observed. I present a partnership model that highlights the 'break-up externality' (i.e., the negative effect of a person's break-up decision on his current partner). Under this externality, there is too much searching for new partners and too much breaking-up of existing partnerships. Restrictions such as a break-up payment and break-up ban can reduce the levels of searching and breaking-up and improve welfare. Thus the paper rationalizes mobility restrictions as welfare-improving arrangements. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Byeongju Jeong, 2003. "The Welfare Effects of Mobility Restrictions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(3), pages 685-696, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:6:y:2003:i:3:p:685-696
    DOI: 10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00015-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination of Mobile Labor," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 152, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Mr. Herman Z Bennett, 2007. "Labor’s Liquidity Service and Firing Costs," IMF Working Papers 2007/120, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination of mobile labor," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 25-46, March.
    4. Bennett, Herman Z., 2011. "Labor's liquidity service and firing costs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 102-110, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mobility restriction; partnership; search; break-up;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General

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