IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/psl/pslqrr/201741.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dealing with the vulnerability of the Italian banking system

Author

Listed:
  • Elisabetta Montanaro

    (University of Siena)

  • Mario Tonveronachi

Abstract

The major vulnerabilities of the Italian banking system are the overhang of NPLs and low profitability. Differently from the attention given to excesses of NPLs, the profitability problem is normally considered to be a matter to be left to bank management and not an area of explicit direct regulatory action. Although focusing on capital requirements, regulators and supervisors seldom pose the question of where capital comes from. Using a large sample of 410 Italian domestic banking groups and individual banks, we propose an NPL stress test and a viability test that show: that the system's vulnerability is a widespread phenomenon; that a further recapitalisation of around ten billion euro is necessary; and that, more importantly, limiting interventions to the overhang problem does not put the majority of Italian banks into a viability path due to the inefficiencies coming from their current business models. The analysis of the Italian case strengthens the critique of current regulation and supervision because, not focusing on bank profitability, they do not avoid threats on solvency coming from the accumulation of NPLs. We thus argue that the structural changes necessary to put the Italian banking system into a viable path require new regulatory and supervisory approaches.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabetta Montanaro & Mario Tonveronachi, 2017. "Dealing with the vulnerability of the Italian banking system," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 70(283), pages 357-420.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2017:41
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/14152/13888
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierluigi Ciocca, 2005. "The Italian Financial System Remodelled," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-00592-1, October.
    2. Avinash Persaud, 2014. "Why Bail-In Securities Are Fool's Gold," Policy Briefs PB14-23, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    3. Jan Kregel, 2014. "Minsky and dynamic macroprudential regulation," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(269), pages 217-238.
    4. Mario Tonveronachi, 2016. "Three proposals for revitalising the European Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(279), pages 301-336.
    5. Kok, Christoffer & Mirza, Harun & Móré, Csaba & Pancaro, Cosimo, 2016. "Adapting Bank Business Models: Financial Stability Implications of Greater Reliance on Fee and Commission Income," Financial Stability Review, European Central Bank, vol. 2.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roberta Arbolino & Raffaele Boffardi & Konstantinos Kounetas & Ugo Marani & Oreste Napolitano, 2024. "Are There Conditions That Can Predict When an M&A Works? The Case of Italian Listed Banks," Economies, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-33, February.
    2. Salvatore Maccarone, 2018. "Note a margine di un saggio di Montanaro e Tonveronachi," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 71(282), pages 139-144.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elisabetta Montanaro & Mario Tonveronachi, 2017. "Vulnerabilita' del sistema bancario italiano. Diagnosi e rimedi (Dealing with the vulnerability of the Italian banking system)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 70(280), pages 299-368.
    2. Andreu, Laura & Serrano, Miguel & Vicente, Luis, 2019. "Efficiency of mutual fund managers: A slacks-based manager efficiency index," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1180-1193.
    3. Pietro Alessandrini & Michele Fratianni & Luca Papi & Alberto Zazzaro, 2016. "The asymmetric burden of regulation: will local banks survive?," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 125, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    4. Gaëtan Le Quang, 2019. "Mind the Conversion Risk: a Theoretical Assessment of Contingent Convertible Bonds," Working Papers hal-04141886, HAL.
    5. Mr. Selim A Elekdag & Sheheryar Malik & Ms. Srobona Mitra, 2019. "Breaking the Bank? A Probabilistic Assessment of Euro Area Bank Profitability," IMF Working Papers 2019/254, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Klapkiv Lyubov & Ulgen Faruk, 2022. "An Evolutionary Perspective on the Endogenous Instability of Capitalist Dynamics," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 9(56), pages 291-308, January.
    7. Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti & Francesco Palazzo, 2020. "Bank profitability and macroeconomic conditions: Are business models different?," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 49(2), July.
    8. Espinosa-Torres, Juan Andrés & Gomez-Gonzalez, Jose Eduardo & Melo-Velandia, Luis Fernando & Moreno-Gutiérrez, José Fernando, 2016. "The international transmission of risk: Causal relations among developed and emerging countries’ term premia," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 646-654.
    9. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    10. Butzbach Olivier & Rotondo Gennaro & Desiato Talita, 2020. "Can banks be owned?," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
    11. Farmer, J. Doyne & Goodhart, C. A. E. & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M., 2021. "Systemic implications of the bail-in design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111903, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Claudia Pigrum & Thomas Reininger & Caroline Stern, 2016. "Bail-in: who invests in noncovered debt securities issued by euro area banks?," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 32, pages 101-119.
    13. Esteban Ramon Perez Caldentey & Lorenzo Nalin & Leonardo Rojas, 2022. "A baseline stock-flow model for the analysis of macroprudential regulation for Latin America and the Caribbean," Working Papers PKWP2217, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    14. Avinash D. Persaud, 2015. "How Not to Regulate Insurance Markets: The Risks and Dangers of Solvency II," Policy Briefs PB15-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    15. Sheila Dow, 2019. "Monetary Reform, Central Banks, and Digital Currencies," International Journal of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(2), pages 153-173, April.
    16. Egert Juuse & Rainer Kattel, 2014. "Financial Regulation in Estonia," Working papers wpaper57, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    17. Pierluigi Ciocca, 2009. "After Keynes, after Sraffa: "Heterodox" Approaches and the Italian Economy," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 4, December.
    18. Sheila Dow, 2020. "Alfred Marshall, Evolutionary Economics and Climate Change: Raffaelli Lecture," Department Discussion Papers 2001, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    19. Andrea Lagna, 2016. "Derivatives and the financialisation of the Italian state," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 167-186, March.
    20. Sofoklis Vogiazas & Constantinos Alexiou, 2019. "Bitcoin: The Road to Hell Is Paved With Good Promises," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 48(1), February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks; NPLs; viability; regulation; supervision; Italy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2017:41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carlo D'Ippoliti (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.economiacivile.it .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.