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Governo del mercato, regolazione e politica industriale: discutendo con Salvatore Biasco (Market governance, regulation and industrial policy: discussing with Salvatore Biasco)

Author

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  • Claudio De Vincenti

    (Universita' di Roma "La Sapienza" e LUISS Institute for European Analysis and Policy)

Abstract

Come auspicava Salvatore Biasco, negli ultimi dieci anni e' riemersa l'esigenza di un intervento pubblico che guidi il mercato. Per dare robustezza a questo orientamento, bisogna partire dalle innovazioni portate dai processi di liberalizzazione e riforma della regolazione, senza considerarli riduttivamente parte – qui il mio dissenso da Biasco – di una egemonia culturale neoliberista. Si tratta di utilizzare gli avanzamenti degli ultimi trent'anni nel campo della regolazione per collocare la politica industriale sul terreno delle corrette regole di mercato. Un'impostazione di politica industriale che, per guidare realmente il funzionamento dell'economia, deve saper tenere conto delle risposte degli operatori all'intervento pubblico e del ruolo del mercato come meccanismo per verificare l'efficacia e l'efficienza delle misure adottate. As Salvatore Biasco hoped, in the last ten years the need for government intervention to guide the market has re-emerged. In order to strengthen this approach, we must start from the innovations brought about by the liberalization and regulatory reform processes. We must not consider them reductively as part of a neoliberal cultural hegemony – here is my disagreement with Biasco. It is necessary to use the progress made in the last three decades in the field of market regulation to design industrial policies on the basis of correct market rules. An industrial policy approach that, in order to really guide the economy, must be able to take into account the operators' responses to government intervention and the role of the market as a mechanism for verifying its effectiveness and efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio De Vincenti, 2023. "Governo del mercato, regolazione e politica industriale: discutendo con Salvatore Biasco (Market governance, regulation and industrial policy: discussing with Salvatore Biasco)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 76(303), pages 211-220.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2023:33
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; industrial policy; market reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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