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The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition: A Note

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  • Stefan Bühler
  • Anton Burger
  • Robert Ferstl

Abstract

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Bühler & Anton Burger & Robert Ferstl, 2008. "The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition: A Note," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-17, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2008:2008-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1989. "Incentives for Cost Reduction under Price Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 93-102, June.
    2. Benjamin F. Hobbs & J. S. Pang, 2007. "Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Electric Power Markets with Piecewise Linear Demand Functions and Joint Constraints," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 113-127, February.
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    6. Genc, Talat S. & Reynolds, Stanley S. & Sen, Suvrajeet, 2007. "Dynamic oligopolistic games under uncertainty: A stochastic programming approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 55-80, January.
    7. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    8. Grobman, Jeffrey H. & Carey, Janis M., 2001. "Price caps and investment: long-run effects in the electric generation industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 545-552, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Breton, Michèle & Kharbach, Mohammed, 2012. "Transportation and storage under a dynamic price cap regulation process," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 918-929.
    2. Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E. M., 2022. "The Impact of Wholesale Price Caps on Forward Contracting," Working Papers 2022-12, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    3. Juha Teirilä and Robert A. Ritz, 2019. "Strategic Behaviour in a Capacity Market? The New Irish Electricity Market Design," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(The New E).
    4. Marcos, Félix, 2011. "Price regulation in oligopolistic markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 13443, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Teirila, J., 2017. "Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1727, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capacity; investment; Cournot competition; price cap;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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