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Gli alti livelli di NPL indeboliscono la capacità delle banche di erogare credito?

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  • Paolo Angelini

Abstract

It has recently been argued that high non-performing loan stocks can limit banks’ lending ability, and thus impair the effectiveness of monetary policy. The present article questions this claim and argues for a more nuanced view. It points to the lack of serious theoretical analysis of the relationship between non-performing loan stocks and credit dynamics; the empirical evidence is also scarce. Policy should focus on maximising the ‘cure rate’ rather than eliminating non-performing loans entirely.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Angelini, 2018. "Gli alti livelli di NPL indeboliscono la capacità delle banche di erogare credito?," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 71(282), pages 129-138.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2018:23
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    File URL: https://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/14367/14068
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fabiano Schivardi & Enrico Sette & Guido Tabellini, 2022. "Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(641), pages 391-423.
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    4. Matteo Accornero & Piergiorgio Alessandri & Luisa Carpinelli & Alberto Maria Sorrentino, 2017. "Non-performing loans and the supply of bank credit: evidence from Italy," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; banking sector; competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers

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