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Seigniorage, electronic money and financial independence of central banks

Author

Listed:
  • H. GROENEVELD

    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

  • A. VISSER

    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

Abstract

Recently, the subject of seigniorage - the revenues deriving from the monetary monopoly - has attracted the attention of academics and policy-makers. The authors discuss the reasons for this interest before undertaking a survey of the implications of a large-scale introduction of electronic money products on the seigniorage revenues and financial independence of central banks in the group of G10 countries. In countries with decreased seigniorage revenues and a high percentage of e-money the financial independence of central banks are negatively affected as a result of their inability to compensate for increasing operational expenses. Measures such as the limitation of e-money issuance and the imposition of requirements on e-money help in curtailing operational costs related to salaries, pensions, publications and banknote circulation, among others.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Groeneveld & A. Visser, 1997. "Seigniorage, electronic money and financial independence of central banks," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(200), pages 69-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1997:14
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10571/10455
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zbigniew Polański & Mikołaj Szadkowski, 2021. "An accounting-based model of seigniorage, and recent monetary developments," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 52(5), pages 391-436.
    2. Berk, Jan Marc, 2001. "New economy, old central banks? Monetary transmission in a new economic environment," Serie Research Memoranda 0032, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    3. Ibrahim L. Awad, 2023. "A Comparative Study of Seigniorage: Egypt and Qatar," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 172-190.
    4. Hans Brits & Carlo Winder, 2005. "Payments are no free lunch," DNB Occasional Studies 302, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Jan Marc Berk, 2002. "Central banking and financial innovation. A survey of the modern literature," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(222), pages 263-297.
    6. Jan Marc Berk, 2002. "Central banking and financial innovation. A survey of the modern literature," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(222), pages 263-297.
    7. Jan Marc Berk, 2002. "Banca centrale e innovazione finanziaria. Una rassegna della letteratura recente," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 55(220), pages 345-385.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Seigniorage; e-money; central bank independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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